Introduction
China is a geographically challenged state, with numerous neighbors on land and at sea. As Samuel Kim once noted, China is a "G-1," a country without real or natural allies.
1 Although it has security relationships with Pakistan and North Korea, these countries, on balance, are liabilities and do little to enhance China's security. As a result, China's relationships with neighboring states, especially those adjacent to its land and sea borders, have played a central role in China's foreign policy during the Mao era and after.
When relations with these states have been poor, China has been more prone to encirclement, as great powers can gain additional sources of leverage over China by improving ties with China's neighbors. By contrast, when relations with these states have been good, China has increased its autonomy, which limits the ability other great powers to constrain China's behavior and allows China to concentrate on domestic issues such as economic growth.
One central feature of China's diplomacy since the end of the Cold War has been the steady engagement of its neighbors, improving ties with almost all these states.
Under the rubric of "omni-directional diplomacy," China normalized ties with estranged neighbors, engaged newly independent states, and improved ties with major states like India and Japan. Such diplomatic success was achieved despite the presence of contentious issues between China and many of its neighbors, especially over disputed territory. In some cases, the resolution of territorial disputes has created a foundation for improved ties. 2 In other cases, the significance of these disputes has been downplayed to allow for the development of deeper political and economic relations. 3 Today, however, China's successful engagement of its periphery has begun to unravel as China has affirmed and asserted its claims in maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. These actions have revealed the limits of China's "good neighborly policy" of the 1990s and most of the 2000s. As a stronger China seeks to defend what it views as its territorial and maritime interests, it threatens the security of its neighbors, who grow increasingly wary of China's long-term intentions. As a result, China's neighbors are balancing against Beijing, externally by improving ties with the United
States and other major powers in the region and internally by strengthening their own military and especially naval capabilities. In turn, the influence of the United States in the region has grown, creating (from China's perspective) the specter of balancing coalitions, at least in the security realm.
China has responded in several different ways to this new situation. To repairs ties with its neighbors and improve its position in the region, China has pursued periods of moderation in its maritime disputes, worked to immunize broader bilateral relations with neighbors from these disputes, and has moved to improve ties with the United States to decrease Washington's role in these disputes. Nevertheless, none of the responses appear to be working because they fail to address concerns about Chinese intentions that these disputes generate -concerns exacerbated by perceptions of growth Chinese power, especially its military capabilities.
This chapter will proceed as follows. The first section will review the importance of China's periphery in Chinese grand strategy and foreign policy. The second section examines how China's defense of its maritime claims have harmed ties with many of its East Asian neighbors, who are now taking actions to enhance their ability to resist China in these disputes, by both strengthening ties with the United States and by investing in greater military capabilities. The third section discusses how China has sought to respond to the worsening of ties with its maritime neighbors in the region.
The Centrality of Regional Diplomacy
Among great powers, past and present, China enjoys a uniquely complex regional security environment. China has fourteen neighbors on land and eight at sea. China's land border runs more than 22,000 kilometers, while its coastline extends approximately 14,500 kilometers. The sheer number of neighbors, in culturally distinctive sub-regions, would pose a daunting diplomatic challenge for any country. But China's situation is even more complicated, given the characteristics of its periphery: Four neighborsRussia, India, Pakistan and North Korea -possess nuclear weapons, while others such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan could easily develop the bomb if they chose to do so.
Some of China's neighbors could be described as potential failed states characterized by great uncertainty about their own domestic political stability, including North Korea and
Afghanistan as well as other states in Central Asia. Two neighbors, India and Russia, possess two of the largest ground forces in the world in addition to nuclear weapons. Fourth, China has actively pursued strategic partnerships with states in the region, especially the most powerful ones including Russia, India and Japan. 13 China developed several slogans to underpin this diplomatic engagement of its neighbors. Overall, it has been described as the "good neighbor policy" (mulin zhengce).
The goals have been described as "becoming friends and partners with neighbors"
(yulinweishan, yilinweiban) and building an "amicable, tranquil, and prosperous neighborhood" (mulin, anlin, fulin) . By the middle of the 2000s, China's ties with most of its neighbors were viewed as an unparalleled success. Economic and political ties deepened while contentious disputes over territory were either resolved or sidelined.
Many observers trumpeted China's "charm offensive" and the rise of China's "soft power." 14 All of this occurred under the rubric of "peaceful rise" and "peaceful development" or the claim that China's rise could be different than past great powers. 
Maritime Disputes and the End of Good Neighborliness
China's "win-win" approach toward its neighbors, however, has begun to unravel. cooperation.
The South China Sea
In the South China Sea, China's pursuit and defense of its maritime claims has worsened ties with many states in Southeast Asia. China's behavior has created States and the Philippines further deepened their security relations. In November 2011, the two countries signed the Manila Declaration to re-affirm the alliance on its 60 th anniversary. 37 In April 2012, the two countries held for a "2+2" ministerial including foreign affairs and defense chiefs for the first time. The meeting outlined a series of strategic objectives and included a detailed action plan, parts of which focused on maritime security (including strengthening its maritime security capabilities and maritime domain awareness).
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Regional states have also engaged India and Japan (discussed in the next section).
Again, Vietnam has been the most active in this regard. As India has invested in
Vietnam's offshore oil and gas fields, it is a natural partner for Hanoi. Although India announced its "look east" policy in the early 1990s, military and maritime cooperation with Vietnam has increased in the last five years. In addition to dialogues and exchanges, the two countries now conduct joint military exercises. In June 2013, for example, four The situation deteriorated in September 2010, when a Chinese fishing vessel entered the territorial waters around the islands and rammed Japanese Coast Guard vessels to evade capture. After the boat and crew were detained, Japan decided to indict the captain for violating a number of domestic laws. China objected to this move, which was seen as an exercise of Japan's sovereignty over the islands and an escalation of the dispute. Over the following two weeks, China's reaction was harsh. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing summoned the Japanese ambassador multiple times, often in the middle of the night. Official delegations and visits to Japan were postponed. While in New York for a meeting at the United Nations, Premier Wen Jiabao offered strong and pointed remarks against Japan, stating that China would take "further measures" and Japan would bear "all the responsibility for consequences" if the captain was not released immediately and unconditionally. 43 Finally, the shipment of rare earth metals used to manufacture a variety of electronics to Japan was postponed, indicating that China would punish Japan economically until the captain was released. Even though Noda argued that central government ownership would be stabilizing, China opposed the move, which was seen as not only an exercise of the sovereignty over the islands but also as strengthening Japan's claim by bringing more of the islands under the direct control of the Japanese government.
In early September, the sale of the islands was completed. China reacted with even greater vigor than in 2010 to register its opposition and to demonstrate that it 45 The survey in 2010 was taken in October, after the fishing captain incident. Third, anti-Japanese protests were permitted to occur for several days throughout the country. These were probably the largest anti-foreign protests since 1989, with demonstrations reportedly in eighty-five cities. 48 Fourth, foreign ministry officials began to use increasingly harsh language. At one point, a senior member of the ministry described Japan's purchase of the three islands "like an atomic bomb dropped on
China." 49 Fifth, during the protests, some Japanese factories and companies were vandalized. Moreover, sales of Japanese cars in Japan (which protestors had targeted)
plummeted by more than 50 percent. Defense Treaty covered the islands. In addition, the islands appear to be playing a greater role in defense planning. In January 2013, working level talks on revising the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, the operational core of the alliance, began in response to
China's increased activities in the East China Sea. 53 In March 2013, the United States and Japan updated plans to defend the islands from attack. 54 In June 2013, the two countries held unprecedented amphibious exercises, "Dawn Blitz," off the coast of California.
In addition, Japan has strengthened ties with other states in an effort to balance China's growing maritime capabilities. In June 2012, Japan and India held their first 51 http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h25/h25-gaiko/zh/z10.html 52 http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h25/h25-gaiko/zh/z02.html 53 "Talks start with U.S. on new defense plan," Kyodo, January 18, 2013. 54 Julian Barnes, "U.S., Japan Update Plans to Defend Islands," Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2013 bilateral naval exercise in waters near Tokyo. 55 In January 2013, Japan and India held their first maritime affairs dialogue, which included diplomatic and military officials.
Japan has also engaged the Philippines, holding maritime dialogues in 2011 and 2013. 56 Japan has also agreed to donate 10 patrol boats to the Philippine Coast Guard in order to strengthen its maritime capacity. In June 2013, Tokyo pledged even greater support for Manila. Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera stated that the two countries "agreed that we will further co-operate in terms of the defense of remote islands." In the East China Sea, China has not adopted a more moderate approach toward Japan since September 2012. The most that could be said is that China has moderated the frequency of patrols within the territorial waters of the disputed Senkaku Islands. As demonstrated in Figure 1 , Chinese government ships have entered the territorial waters around the islands between three and eight times per month. Nevertheless, the situation remains deadlocked, as Japan refuses to accede to China's demand that Tokyo acknowledge the presence of a dispute over the islands. As a result, the situation remains brittle and prone to spikes in tension. In October 2013, for example, Japan stated that it would shoot unidentified drones over the islands following the flight of a Chinese drone in September roughly 100 kilometers north of the island. In November 2013, perhaps in response to Japan's stance on drones as well as a desire to increase pressure on Japan, China announced the establishment of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone 71 The new fishing rules generated some concern because the repeated earlier rules requiring foreign ships to receive approval to fish in waters under Hainan's administration. See M. Taylor Fravel, "Hainan's New Fishing Rules: A Preliminary Analysis," The Diplomat, January 10, 2014.
in November 2013. The People's Daily described the difference between the East China Sea and South China Sea as "tension in the east, stability in the south" (dongjin nanwen).
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Figure 1
Second, China has tried to prevent the maritime disputes from harming overall relations with other countries. Although China has pursued this approach in the past in many disputes, including with India today, it has nevertheless become more challenging under the shadow of growing Chinese military capabilities and especially naval power. because of fears about how a stronger China will behave in the region in the future.
To date, China's active defense of its claims in maritime disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have harmed ties with opposing states and increased the attractiveness of the United States for others in the region. The poses a clear challenge to China's foreign policy, which from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s sought to improve ties with all of its neighbors, to create space for China's development and to limit the role of major powers in the region. If current trends persist, and tensions in existing territorial dispute continue to spiral upwards, worsening ties with neighboring states will increase the value of strong U.S. presence for others in the region and for states to work together to balance against China in the maritime domain. Over time, this could accelerate polarization of the region and create a much more competitive environment that ultimately harm Chinese interests more than it advances them. As the more powerful state in these disputes, proactive action by China is needed to restore stability.
